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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN NORTH DAKOTA ASSET
FORFEITURE LAW AFTER AUSTIN V. UNITED STATES,
ALEXANDER V. UNITED STATES, AND UNITED STATES V. GOOD
REAL PROPERTY
RICK MAIXNER*
SIDNEY HERTZ FIERGOLA**

I. INTRODUCTION
Forfeiture of property that has been used for unlawful purposes is a
remedy with ancient beginnings.
The conceptual underpinnings of civil forfeiture can be traced
back to ancient Roman and medieval English law, both of
which made objects used to violate the law subject to forfeiture
to the sovereign. Our laws providing for official seizure of
property used in criminal activity perpetuate the legal fiction
that "property used in violation of law was itself the wrongdoer
that must be held to account for the harms it had caused."
Because the property, or res, is considered the wrongdoer, it is
regarded as the actual party to in rem forfeiture proceedings.'
Today, asset forfeitures are one of the most effective weapons
available to law enforcement in the battle against organized crime and
the war on drugs. The federal asset forfeiture statutes, as well as North
Dakota's statutes, allow forfeiture of the proceeds of criminal activity or
the instrumentalities of crime without conviction of the underlying
crime. 2
* Rick Maixner is a 1994 graduate with distinction of the University of North Dakota School of
Law. He worked as an intern in the Criminal and Regulatory Division of the North Dakota Attorney
General's Office during the summer of 1993, principally, initiating asset forfeitures and writing district
court briefs. Portions of this article began as a paper for Criminal Justice Seminar. Acknowledgment
is given to Professor Larry Kraft for his help, advice and encouragement. Rick is currently employed
by Peterson, Schmitz, Moench & Schmidt, Bismarck, North Dakota.
** Sidney Hertz Fiergola is a 1980 graduate of Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley,
Massachusetts. She also studied at the University of East Anglia. Norwich, England in 1978 and 1979.
In 1983 she obtained a J.D. degree from the University of North Dakota School of Law. She was
appointed as a North Dakota assistant attorney general in 1984 and worked in the area of welfare law.
In 1987 she joined the North Dakota attorney general's civil litigation division where she was counsel
to the Department of Human Services and represented many state agencies and officials in civil rights
litigation. In 1992 she joined the criminal and regulatory division of the attorney general's office
where she was responsible for consumer fraud, liquor, gaming, and asset forfeiture litigation. She is
currently working in Minneapolis as a consultant on Indian gaming issues.
1. United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37,45 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
2. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-31.1-04 (1991) (stating that "[florfeiture is a civil proceeding not
dependent upon a prosecution for, or a conviction of, a criminal offense. . . ."); see also One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 233-235 (1972) (holding that forfeiture was not
barred by either collateral estoppel or double jeopardy when the claimant has been acquitted of the
underlying criminal charges); State v. One Chevrolet Pickup, No. 940066 (N.D. Oct. 27. 1994) (stating
that because the burden of proof for forfeiture of property is different from the burden of proof for a
crime. "neither a criminal charge nor a criminal conviction of a felony is a prerequisite to civil
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An asset forfeiture is a civil, rather than a criminal proceeding. 3
However, some courts describe forfeiture actions as a quasi-criminal
action. 4 Once the government has established probable cause 5 that the
asset is forfeitable, the burden shifts to the claimant to prove by a
preponderance of evidence 6 that the property should not be forfeited. 7
This standard of proof is a departure from the "innocent until proven
guilty" and "beyond a reasonable doubt" concepts of traditional criminal
law. Because of this lower level of proof for the government, and
because forfeitures are usually directed against high profit crimes such

forfeiture").
3. N.D. CENT.CODE § 29-31.1-04 (1991); see also State v. Ronngren. 356 N.W.2d 903, 906
(N.D. 1984) (forfeitures are considered civil in nature).
4. United States v. $7,850.00 in U.S. Currency, 7 F.3d 1355, 1357 (8th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Lot 7 and Lot 8, Block 14,876 F.2d 1362, 1369 (8th Cir. 1989).
5. See United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that in
forfeiture proceedings, the burden of establishing probable cause by the government requires only a
showing that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the property was used or is intended to be used
for prohibited purposes). See also United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37,47 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that
the complaint need not "meet the ultimate trial burden of showing probable cause for forfeiture; it
simply needs to establish a 'reasonable belief that the government can show probable cause for
forfeiture at trial'") (quoting United States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $150,660.00, 980 F.2d
1200, 1204-05 (8th Cir. 1992)). See also infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing the
division between circuits over whether a "substantial connection" to criminal activity is required or
only a "nexus").
"Whether probable cause exists is a question of law." State v. Birk, 484 N.W.2d 834, 837
(N.D. 1992) (citations omitted). "Probable cause is only a minimal, threshhold burden ...[,]
greater
than mere suspicion, but ... less than that needed to convict for the suspected crime." State v. One
1990 Chevrolet Pickup, No. 940066. slip op. at 8-9 (N.D. Oct 27, 1994). The probable cause required
to institute forfeiture is the same requirement that applies to seizure warrants. United States v.
$149,442.43 in United States Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 876 (10th Cir. 1992). North Dakota adopted the
"totality of the circumstances" test for determining probable cause. State v. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d
207, 211 (N.D. 1988). This test is satisfied "when facts and circumstances within a police officer's
knowledge and of which he has reasonable, trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant men of
reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been or is being committed." State v. Bauder, 433
N.W.2d 552, 553 (N.D. Ct. App. 1988); see also United States v. Property at 255 Broadway, Hanover.
9 F.3d 1000, 1004 (1st Cir. 1993); Birk, 484 N.W.2d at 837, 839-40. In evaluating a probable cause
determination, the North Dakota Supreme Court does not weigh the evidence, but ascertains "whether
there was some relevant evidence to support the finding of probable cause." Hinkel v. Racek, 514
N.W.2d 382, 383 (N.D. 1994). Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." Id.
6. See State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, No. 940066, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Oct. 27, 1994). See
also United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d at 816 (stating that once the government has met its
burden of showing probable cause, the burden shifts to the claimant to show that the property is not
forfeitable). "The claimant cannot meet this burden by simply resting on his or her pleadings; instead,
the claimant 'must set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial' . . . [ijf unrebutted, a showing of probable cause alone will support forfeiture.'" Id.
(citations omitted).
7. See, e.g., United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814. 816 (8th Cir. 1992); State v.
$2585.00 United States Currency, Civ. No. 16,249, Burleigh County Dist. Ct. Order (N.D. July 9. 1992)
(stating that once the state has established probable cause for forfeiture, the burden shifts to those
claiming the property to prove that the property is not subject to forfeiture).
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as drug dealing, asset forfeitures elicit controversy. 8 The controversy has
led some appellate courts to comment adversely on the government's use
of forfeitures and to urge lower courts to analyze forfeitures for due
process compliance. 9 The controversy has also caused frequent appeals
and has led to rapidly changing case law.
This article will address the constitutional- issues affecting asset
forfeitures following the several forfeiture decisions of the United States
Supreme Court during 1993. Accordingly, it will analyze possible
challenges to forfeitures based upon double jeopardy, excessiveness, and
due process.
The United States Supreme Court decided three important forfeiture
cases in 1993: Austin v. United States,lO Alexander v. United States,' I
and United States v. Good Real Property. 2 In Austin, the Court
addressed the applicability of the excessive fines clause of the Eighth
Amendment in an in rem asset forfeiture. 13 In Alexander, the Court
addressed excessive fines as applied to an in personam asset forfeiture
and whether forfeiture of pornographic materials constitutes a prior
restraint on a defendant's First Amendment right to freedom of speech.14
In Good Real Property, the Court addressed two due process issues
relating to the seizure and forfeiture of real property: ex parte seizure of
real property, and the requirement for prompt initiation of forfeiture
actions after the seizure. 15 This article will analyze the constitutional
issues addressed in these cases and identify the tests for evaluation of
each of the issues. Because the United States Supreme Court decisions

8. See, e.g., United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37,46 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that civil forfeiture
is"'one of the most potent weapons in the judicial armamentarium'" and "the favored method for
imposing significant economic sanctions against narcotics traffickers." but also noting that "the ease
with which the government can seize property and the potential hardships caused to innocent owners
who seek to recover their property once the government has seized it have elicited concern from
courts and commentators alike" (quoting United States v. 384-390 West Broadway, 964 F.2d 1244.
1248 (1st Cir. 1992))).
9. See id. at 57 (cautioning "[wie therefore stress the need for courts to ensure that what little
due process is provided for in the statutory scheme is preserved in practice"); see also United States v.
All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating "[w]e continue to be
enormously troubled by the government's increasing and virtually unchecked use of the civil forfeiture
statutes and the disregard for due process that is buried in those statutes").
10. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
11. 113S.Ct.2766(1993).
12. 114 S.Ct. 492 (1993).
13. Austin v.United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2804 (1993). In rein forfeitures are directed atthe
property itself as the defendant, rather than at the owner. Id. For a discussion of the history and
theory of in rein forfeitures, see id.at 2808-2810.
14. Alexander v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 2769-70. In personam forfeitures are directed
at the owner of the property, rather than at the property itself. See United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d
1409, 1414 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987).
15. United States v. Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 497 (1993). Note that different due
process considerations come into play during each step of a seizure/forfeiture.
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articulate basic constitutional protections, and because of the parallels
between North Dakota and federal statutory and constitutional
provisions, a similar analysis for state and federal forfeitures is
appropriate. 16
II. NORTH DAKOTA'S ASSET FORFEITURE STATUTES
North Dakota has a number of asset forfeiture statutes. 17 But,
because two statutes are similar to the federal statute in substance and
purpose, those two statutes, the controlled substances forfeiture statute18
and the criminal forfeiture statute, 19 are central to this article. Chapter
29-31.1 of the North Dakota Century Code applies to the forfeiture of
property associated with any criminal activity; chapter 19-03.1 is the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, containing the forfeiture provisions
for property associated with violations of that act. 20 Forfeitures under
both statutes are conducted according to the procedures provided for in
chapter 19-03.1.21.

16. The North Dakota Supreme Court recently decided State v. One Black 1989 Cadillac. No.
930352 (N.D. Oct. 3, 1994), and State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, No. 940066 (N.D. Oct. 27.
1994), and applied federal interpretations in analyzing the cases.
17. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-30-03 (Supp. 1993) (authorizing the forfeiture of property
used or possessed in connection with an automobile chop shop): see also id. § 20.1-10-01 (1991)
(authorizing forfeiture of property associated with the violation of game and fish laws).
18. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-36 to -38 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
19. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-31.1-01 to -10 (1991).
20. Id. § 19-03.1-36. Forfeitable property is defined by sections 19-03.1-36(1) and
29-31.1-01(1) of the North Dakota Century Code. These statutes provide that all controlled substances
are forfeitable, and all products and equipment used to manufacture any controlled substance are
forfeitable. Id. § 19-03.1-36(1)(a), (c). In addition, all property used or intended for use as a
container for a controlled substance is subject to forfeiture. Id. § 19-03.1-36(1)(d). Vehicles. vessels.
and aircraft used to transport or facilitate the sale of controlled substances are also subject to
forfeiture. Id. § 19-03.1-36(1)(e). Under the criminal forfeiture statute, property that is contraband,
property that is used to facilitate a crime, property that is used to induce a crime or is proceeds of a
crime, or a vehicle used in the commission of a felony is forfeitable. Id. § 29-31.1-01(])(a) - (e).
Under this statute, however, the general provision allowing forfeiture of property used to facilitate a
crime does not apply to vehicles, which are forfeitable only if the underlying crime is a felony. State
v. One 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, No. 940066, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Oct. 27, 1994). This restriction does not
apply to vehicles used in association with drug trafficking. Vehicles are forfeitable if "used, or
intended for use, to transport. or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for the purpose of sale
or receipt of [controlled substances]." N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36 (1991).
21. Subsection 29-31.1-04(2) requires that proceedings brought under chapter 29-31.1 follow
the procedures established in sections 19-03.1-36.1 to -36.7. The procedures include a requirement
that a summons and complaint be filed in the district court for the county in which the property was
seized, N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36.3: that the action be brought in the name of the state, id. §
19-03.1-36.3; that notice be given to any person having an interest in the property, id. § 19-03.1-36.3,
and that the complaint list the property to be forfeited, any party with a legal interset in the property,
and the underlying criminal activity, id. § 19-03.1-36.3. Chapter 19-03.1 also establishes the burden of
proof for each party, the hearing procedures, id. § 19-03.1-36.6, the establishment of security interests
in property to be forfeited, id. § 19-03.1-36.7, and qualified immunity for those performing their
official duties with respect to the chapter, id. § 19-03.1-37(3).

19941

ASSET FORFEITURE LAW

855

The Uniform Controlled Substances Act allows seizure of
forfeitable property without prior notice and a hearing. 22 A seizure of
property may be made without process when the seizure is incident to an
arrest, incident to a search under warrant, or the law enforcement agency
has probable cause to believe that the property has been used or will be
used in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.2 3 The
criminal forfeiture statute allows seizure without process "whenever and
wherever the [forfeitable] property is found within this state . . . by
taking custody of the property." 24 Forfeiture proceedings may also
begin "by serving upon the person in possession of the property a notice
of forfeiture and seizure." 25
When the underlying crime involves the
sale of a controlled substance, property may be forfeited under either
chapter 19-03.1 or chapter 29-31.1, since the property has been used to
violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, and the property has also
been used to "facilitate the commission of a criminal offense." 26
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES
A.

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITIONS ON CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND ExCESSIVE FINES

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed nor

22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36(2) provides:
Property subject to forfeiture under this chapter. except conveyances. may be seized by
the board upon process issued by any district court having jurisdiction over the property.
A conveyance subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by a state, county,
or city law enforcement agency upon process issued by any district court having
jurisdiction over the conveyance. Seizure without process may be made if:
a. The seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under a search warrant or an
inspection under an administrative inspection warrant.
b. The property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the
state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceedings based upon this.chapter.
c. The board or a law enforcement agency has probable cause to believe that the
property is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety.
d. The board or a law enforcement agency has probable cause to believe that the
property was used or is intended to be used in violation of this chapter.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. § 29-31.1-03 (1991). Forfeitable property is defined at section 29-31.1-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-31.1-03 (1991). If the court finds that forfeiture is warranted, the
property must then be delivered to the seizing agency. Id.
26. See United States v. 3639 2nd St. N.E., 869 F.2d 1093. 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) (defining
"facilitate" as an activity "making the prohibited conduct less difficult or 'more or less free from
obstruction or hindrance'") (quoting United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154,
157 (3rd Cir. 1981)). See generally State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Pickup, No. 940066 (N.D. Oct. 27,
1994) (discussing facilitation).
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cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 27 These same words appear in
article I, section 11 of the North Dakota Constitution. Thus, analogies
between federal and North Dakota constitutional interpretations are
facilitated. 28 Analogies are appropriate, however, only when statutes are
similar.
The Eighth Amendment contains two distinct prohibitions against
punishments: a prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments and a
prohibition against excessive fines. 2 9
After the Supreme Court's
decision in Austin, the prohibition against excessive fines is applicable to
forfeitures. 3 0 Because there are two distinct prohibitions against
punishment, however, some courts have concluded that two separate
constitutional tests are required for forfeitures. The first test determines
whether the forfeiture violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment; the second test determines whether the punishment
constitutes an excessive fine. 3 1 Of the cases decided in 1993, Austin is
the most significant for North Dakota and other states with asset
forfeiture statutes because it requires an excessive fines test 3 2 that most
courts did not believe was required prior to the Austin decision.
1. Austin v. United States
Richard Lyle Austin, the claimant in Austin, owned a co-located
auto body shop and mobile home in South Dakota. 3 3 From this
property, he made a two gram cocaine sale to an undercover agent. 34
After the state obtained a conviction on the drug charges in state court,
the federal government initiated action to forfeit Austin's home and shop

27. U.S. CONST. Amend. VIII.
28. State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d 1. 12 (N.D. 1981). The Goetz court stated:
[glenerally, where the Legislature [has] adopted a federal statute there is a presumption
the Legislature intended to accomplish purposes and objectives similar to those of the
Congress which enacted the law[;] [ajlso, where the statute has been construed by the
federal courts before the Legislature adopted the statute it is presumed that the
Legislature adopted the statute with the construction placed upon it by the federal courts.
Id. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36 (1991) with 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) (using virtually
identical language to list property subject to forfeiture and property subject to seizure without
process).
29. U.S. CONsr. Amend. VIII.
30. Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993). Central to the Supreme Court's holding
in Austin is its conclusion that a forfeiture is punishment. Id.
31. See, e.g., United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive. 954 F.2d 38. 39 (2d Cir. 1992)
[hereinafter Whalers Cove] (evaluating proportionality under the cruel and unusual punishments
clause, but evaluating excessiveness under the excessive fines clause); see also United States v. RR I
Box 224, 14 F.3d 864. 874 n.10 (3rd Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Winslow] (discussing the difference
between the excessiveness analysis and that for cruel and unusual punishments).
32. Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2812.
33. Id. at 2803.
34. Id.
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as instrumentalities of crime. 35 This action was successful in district
court. Austin appealed to the Eighth Circuit, arguing that the forfeiture
of his home and business was an excessive fine under the Eighth
Amendment, and that the forfeiture was not proportional 3 6 to the
seriousness of the crime he committed. 37 The Eighth Circuit upheld the
forfeiture, 3 8 and Austin applied for, and was granted, certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court. 3 9 The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit to evaluate the excessiveness of
the forfeiture in relation to the crime and to develop a test for excessiveness. 40 The Eighth Circuit has not yet reached its decision in the case.
2. Alexander v. United States
The Supreme Court announced its decision in Alexander v. United
States at the same time as Austin. 4 1 The Court also addressed excessiveness in Alexander.4 2 After a four-month jury trial, Alexander was
convicted of seventeen obscenity offenses and three Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) offenses. 43 He was
sentenced to six years in prison, fined $100,000, and ordered to pay
prosecution costs and other related expenses. 4 4 In addition, he was
ordered to forfeit wholesale and retail businesses (which included ten
pieces of real estate and thirty-one current or former businesses), the
assets from those businesses, and nearly nine million dollars obtained
from his racketeering activities. 4 5
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the forfeiture order, 46 holding
that the application of the RIC047 forfeiture provisions did not constitute
a prior restraint on speech, 48 and that the order did not violate the Eighth

35. Id.
36. For a discussion of the application of proportionality in determining whether a forfeiture
violates the excessive fines clause, see Winslow. 14 F.3d at 873-875. See also infra part Il1.A.3
(discussing the proper proportionality test to determine excessiveness).
37. Id. at 875.
38. United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814. 818 (8th Cir. 1992).
39. Austin v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 1036 (1993).
40. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
41. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2769-70.
44. Id. at 2770.
45. Id.
46. Alexander v. Thomburgh, 943 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1991).
47. RICO is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1988). The forfeiture provisions are included in 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988). The statute provides that
all property used in the criminal activity, as well as any interest in such property, as well as property
which is the proceeds or profits from the criminal activity may be forfeited. United States v. Busher.
817 F.2d 1409, 1413 (1987).
48. Alexander. 953 F.2d at 834.
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Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" and
"lexcessive fines." 49 The court refused to consider, however, whether the
forfeiture was "grossly disproportionate or excessive" in violation of the
0
Eighth Amendment. 5
The Supreme Court concluded that the forfeiture order was not a
prior restraint on free speech,51 but was a "punishment for past criminal
conduct." 52 Although the Court held that the RICO forfeiture provisions
did not violate the First Amendment, the Court remanded the case to the
Eighth Circuit for its determination of whether the penalty was
"excessive." 53 The Supreme Court also noted that the analysis employed
by the lower court did not distinguish between Alexander's arguments
that the forfeiture order was either a "cruel and unusual punishment" or
an "excessive fine." 54 The Court explained that although a proportionality review is not required for duration and conditions for confinement
other than a life sentence without possibility of parole, that logic did not
apply to the need for an evaluation for excessiveness of forfeitures. 55
Because "[tihe Excessive Fines Clause limits the Government's power to
extract payment, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some
offense," and the forfeiture order is "clearly a form of monetary
punishment," the Court concluded that the in personam forfeiture at
issue in Alexander must be analyzed under the Excessive Fines Clause. 56
The clear mandate from Austin and Alexander is that forfeitures of
property imposed by statute for associated criminal activity are subject to
review for excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment, whether in rein
or in personam.

49. Id. at 835.
50. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that such an examination was not
required by reasoning that the Eighth Amendment "'does not require a proportionality review of any
sentence less than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.'" Id. at 836 (quoting State v.
Pryba, 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 305 (1990)).
51. Id. at 2772. Although the First Amendment issues considered in Alexander are beyond the
scope of this article, the Court's holding was based on the logic that Alexander could open another
store to sell printed materials and that no advance determination was being made whether the
materials sold at a new store were prohibited. Id.
52. Id. The Alexander Court also noted that it previously rejected First Amendment challenges
to stringent. prison sentences and fines. Id. at 2773. The Court rejected the argument that the RICO
forfeiture provisions were overbroad. Id. at 2774-75.
53. Id. at 2776.
54. Alexander, 113 S.Ct. at 2775.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2775-76. The court did note, however, that Alexander created and managed an
"enormous racketeering enterprise" for a substantial period of time and stated "[ilt
is in the light of the
extensive criminal activities which petitioner apparently conducted through this racketeering
enterprise over a substantial period of time that the question of whether or not the forfeiture was
,excessive' must be considered." Id. at 2776.
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3.

Application of the Eighth Amendment in the
Courts of Appeals
Prior to Austin and Alexander, there was a split in the circuits over
the need for an excessiveness evaluation of forfeitures.5 7 The Second
Circuit required an excessiveness test for in rem forfeitures, but none of
the other circuits did.58 There was also a split in the circuits over the
need for an excessiveness examination of in personam forfeitures. 59 The
Supreme Court reconciled this split by remanding Austin and Alexander
to the Eighth Circuit for the development of a test for excessiveness. 60
The Court also noted in Austin that the Second Circuit currently imposed
such a test for in rem forfeitures. 6 1 The Second Circuit has retained the
test it developed previous to Austin. 62 A decision by the Eighth Circuit
in Austin should establish the excessiveness test for this circuit. However,
because the Second Circuit had an Eighth Amendment test in place prior
to Austin which it continues to use, and because other circuits now look
to the Second Circuit for authority on excessiveness, 6 3 there is a
reasonable possibility that the test developed in the Eighth Circuit will be
similar. 64
The Eighth Amendment forfeiture analysis performed by the
Second Circuit is a two-step evaluation to determine first whether the
punishment violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and
65
second whether the punishment violates the Excessive Fines Clause.
Prior to Austin there was no guidance concerning the appropriate
analysis for excessiveness, 6 6 and very little guidance was offered in
Austin itself, other than to resolve the split between circuits as to the

57. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804.
58. Compare Whalers Cove. 954 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying an excessiveness test to a
forfeiture of real property) with United States v. 508 Depot Street. 964 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding that proportionality analysis is not appropriate in civil forfeitures); see also Winslow, 14 F.3d
864, 873 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the Second Circuit was the only circuit imposing a test for
excessiveness before Austin).
59. See United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 722 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing the split among
the circuits over the need for an excessiveness evaluation of in personam forfeitures).
60. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812; Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2776.
61. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804.
62. United States v. 835 Seventh St.. 832 F. Supp. 43, 48 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that Whalers
Cove still controls).
63. Winslow, 14 F.3d at 874 (using Whalers -Cove as the beginning point for its discussion of
excessiveness).
64. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804 (citing Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 35, 38-39, as an example of
the split between circuits over the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to in rein forfeitures).
65. Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 38, 39.
66. See id. at 39 (lamenting the fact that "the Supreme Court has provided no guidance, except to
observe that fines must be closely scrutinized because they benefit the government').
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necessity for any Eighth Amendment analysis. 67 Since Austin, further
discussion has arisen concerning the proper test for excessiveness. One
of the more extensive appellate interpretations of Austin is found in a
Third Circuit case, United States v. R.R.1 Box 224 (Winslow).68
The direction offered to district courts by the Third Circuit in
Winslow 6 9 suggests a combination of tests from the Second Circuit's
Whalers Cove, 7 0 the Supreme Court's Solem v. Helm, 1 and its own
analysis articulated in United States v. Sarbello.72 In Whalers Cove, the
Second Circuit indicated it would impose a test for excessiveness similar
to the one it imposed for proportionality, which is the three-part test
from Solem v. Helm. 73 Although the Solem analysis has been questioned
in later cases, 74 it remains the only widely accepted test for proportionality.7 5 To be in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
under Solem v. Helm, the punishment must be "grossly disproportionate"
to the crime committed. 7 6 The three factors to be considered to
determine whether a punishment is disproportionate are "(1) the inherent
gravity of the offense; (2) the sentences imposed for similarly grave
offenses in the same jurisdiction; and (3) sentences imposed for the same
crime in other jurisdictions." 77
- A possible indicator of the future direction for courts in Eighth
Amendment excessiveness analysis may also be found in the analysis
currently used for in personam forfeitures.7 8 Partially because the
requirement for proportionality review of RICO forfeitures was required
by statute, and also because the proportionality review of in personam
forfeitures was more clearly required by the Eighth Amendment, the

67. See Austin. 113 S.Ct. at 2812 (declining the invitation by Austin to establish a test for
excessiveness and directing the lower courts to formulate such a test).
68. 14 F.3d at 873 (questioning the excessiveness analysis in Whalers Cove in light of the
Supreme Court's holding in Austin).
69. Winslow, 14 F.3d at 873-875.
70. 954 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1992).
71. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
72. 985 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1993).
73. See Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 39 (declining to decide at what level a forfeiture becomes
excessive, but indicating that excessiveness would be determined by comparing the value of the
forfeiture to the fine imposed for the crime in the federal penal system and in the various states).
74. Harmelin v. Michigan. 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2705 (199 1); see also, Neal v. Grammer, 975 F.2d
463, 465 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that in light of Harmelin v. Michigan, the Eighth Circuit would only
review a sentence to determine if it is "grossly 'disproportioned' to the crime").
75. Winslow, 14 F.3d at 874 n.10 (distinguishing Harmelin as addressing the cruel and unusual
punishments clause, rather than the excessive fines clause).
76. Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 38 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983)).
77. Id.
78. See, Winslow, 14 F.3d 864, 875 (3d Cir. 1994) (suggesting that district courts look to an in
personaindecision, United States v. Sarbello. 985 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1993), for direction in performing
a proportionality analysis for excessive fines).
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case law imposing such a test is more abundantly available. 79 The test
adopted by those circuits which have adopted an excessiveness test for in
personam forfeitures is a combination of the Solem v. Helm three-part
proportionality test with the statutory RICO test of the relationship of the
property to the crime. 80 This combination test may well be applied to in
rem forfeitures as well if lower courts interpret Austin with a view toward
8
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion. 1
In his concurrence in Austin, Justice Scalia maintained that the only
appropriate excessive fines analysis to be performed in an in rem asset
forfeiture is a measure of the relationship of the property to the crime. 82
In Scalia's opinion, the value of the asset is not important: "[sicales used
to measure out unlawful drug sales, for example, are confiscable whether
made of the purest gold or of the basest metal." 83 Although the majority
would not go so far as to endorse the relationship between property and
offense as the only criteria for an excessive fines analysis, they agreed
that it could be a factor. 84 The connection of the property to the crime
is also the initial test to determine whether property is forfeitable, 8 5 and is
part of the proportionality analysis required by statute for an in
personam RICO forfeiture. 86 Because of the availability of the test, and
because of Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, it is highly likely that
criminal taint of the property, or a nexus between the property and the
crime will be part of any proportionality test developed.
The Second Circuit had adopted a nexus test to establish probable
cause, the initial burden for the government in a forfeiture, prior to
Austin. 87 Unfortunately, the circuits do not agree as to the proper test
for the relationship of the property to the crime. 88 Some circuits require

79. See, e.g., Sarbello. 985 F.2d at 724; see also United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415
(9th Cir. 1987). Both cases held that the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause applies to RICO
forfeitures.
80. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1415-16; see also Sarbello. 985 F.2d at 721-24.
81. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2815 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2812 n.15.
85. United States v. 4492 Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1268-69 (2d Cir. 1989).
86. Sarbello, 985 F.2d at 724: Busher, 817 F.2d at 1416. Both cases held that forfeiture of a
partially legitimate enterprise is proportional only to the extent of the approximate criminal taint of the
enterprise.
87. See 4492 Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at 1269 (rejecting the argument that forfeiture requires a
'substantial connection" between the crime and the property and holding that a 'nexus' between drug
activity and the property is sufficient); see also Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 33 (affirming that 'nexus' is
sufficient); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 56 (2d Cir. 1993) (defining the 'nexus' standard as
'reasonable grounds' amounting to 'more than mere suspicion' but less than "prima facie proof').
88. See United States v. 427 and 429 Hall Street. 842 F. Supp. 1421, 1426 n.10 (M.D. Ala. 1994)
(discussing the division between circuits over the proper test for establishment of probable cause).
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only a nexus, others require a "substantial connection," and others have
not decided the issue. 8 9 If "substantial connection" were used as the
initial burden to be met by the government in a forfeiture, it would
appear that Justice Scalia's test for excessivenness would be satisfied, and
further analysis for excessiveness would be unnecessary unless the
forfeiture is financially "grossly" or "overwhelmingly" excessive. The
Second Circuit now favors this test. 90
If the initial probable cause determination is used as the relationship
test for excessiveness, it may greatly simplify a trial court's determination
of forfeitability. 9 1 This may not be acceptable in some instances,
however, depending upon the appellate requirements of independent
evaluation of the probable cause and excessiveness tests. 92 An example
of the use of the initial probable cause determination as the sole
relationship test for excessiveness and how it may simplify a trial court's
determination of forfeitability is seen in United States v. 427 and 429
Hall Street.93 In Hall Street, the Alabama district court adopted Justice
Scalia's nexus test, finding that a grocery store which had been used
extensively for illegal drug transactions was sufficiently related to the
crime to render the grocery store forfeitable without comparison of the
value of the property to the severity of the offense. 94
In a more careful interpretation of Austin, the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois decided that an excessiveness evaluation is
required for an instrumentality of crime, but is not required for
contraband. 9 5 The court used an expanded definition of contraband,
finding that the proceeds of drug sales were contraband, but that money
intended to be used for drug purchases was an instrumentality, and
hence subject to an excessiveness test. 9 6 The District Court for the
Eastern District of Illinois used a different logic to reach the same
conclusion: that proceeds are forfeitable without regard to proportionali-

89. Id.
90. Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 38-39.
91. See United States v. 427 & 429 Hall Street, 842 F. Supp. 1421, 1429 (M.D. Ala. 1994)
(finding that the initial probable cause showing by the government was also sufficient to fulfill Justice
Scalia's relationship test for excessiveness).
92. See, e.g., Winslow, 14 F.3d at 873 (suggesting that district courts should avoid combining the
Eighth Amendment inquiry with the nexus requirement, even though the two tests share some
characteristics).
93. 842 F. Supp. 1421, 1430 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (finding that the property was an instrumentality
of crime, that the-property was "substantially connected" to the sale of drugs, and hence was
forfeitable).
94. United States v. 427 & 429 Hall Street, 842 F. Supp. 1421, 1430 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
95. United States v. $45,140.00 Currency, 839 F. Supp 556, 558 (N.D. I11.1993).
96. Id.
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ty, but that an instrumentality must be analyzed for compliance. 97 The
Eastern District used the "relation back doctrine," which vests the
government's interest in property at the time that the crime is committed. 98 Under this doctrine, the district court was able to state that "[i]f an
item is a proceed of an illegal drug transaction, its forfeiture is
exclusively remedial, as it cannot be considered punishment to take away
something the claimant never legitimately owned." 99 Under the logic
developed by these federal district courts in Illinois and Alabama,
proceeds of criminal activity are forfeitable without regard to proportionality, but an instrumentality must be analyzed. That analysis must at
least in part take into account the association of the property with the
crime committed.10 0
While much division remains on the tests to be applied, some
procedural steps in an Eighth Amendment challenge of an asset
forfeiture appear to be widely accepted. As an initial matter, it appears
that the burden is on the claimant to show that the forfeiture is
excessive, 10 1 or grossly disproportionate, to the seriousness of the
crime. 10 2 Once this burden has been met, "the district court must make a
determination . . . that the interest ordered forfeited is not so grossly
disproportionate to the offense committed as to violate the [E]ighth
[A]mendment."i0 3 The determination by the district court should be
made using the three factor test from Solem v. Hehin.1 0 4 When
performing the test from Solem v. He/in, it is important that the court
include the total punishment imposed for the offense, including both the
forfeiture and the criminal punishments such as fines or incarceration.1 05
Asset forfeitures promise to be the subject of widespread litigation
as trial and appellate courts struggle with the implications of Austin and
Alexander with little guidance from the Supreme Court and a division
between circuits. The one premise on which all courts will now be
bound, however, is that forfeitures which are "grossly disproportionate"
to the crime committed will be analyzed for violation of the Eighth

97. United States v. Assets of West Side Bldg. Corp., 843 F. Supp. 377. 385 (N.D. I11.1994).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 383 (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617. 624-28
(1989)).
100. Hall Street, 842 F.Supp. at 1429 (adopting Justice Scalia's logic of relationship to the crime
as the exclusive test); see also West Side Bldg., 843 F. Supp. at 385-86. (stating that in order to perform
a proportionality analysis, the court must know the crime committed as well as the nature and value of
the property sought to be forfeited).
101. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1415.
102. Sarbello, 985 F.2d at 724.
103. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1415.
104. 463 U.S. at 290-92; see also Busher, 817 F.2d at 1415.
105. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1415 n. 10.

864

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70:4

Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. A closely related analysis is
brought to bear for possible violations of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
B.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment "protects
against three abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction;
and multiple punishments for the same offense."106
As an initial matter, double jeopardy is not invoked when the
1 07
second penalty or prosecution is not pursued by the same sovereign,
08
unless one sovereign is shown to be acting as the tool of the other.1
This is particularly significant when controlled substances are involved,
since joint state and federal task forces are frequently used for drug
investigations.1 09 The result of this cooperation may be a sharing of
forfeited property by the two sovereigns. 110 This sharing of property,
however, is not sufficient to show that one sovereign is acting as the tool
or agent of the other. Ill In order to invoke double jeopardy, the
defendant must show either that the second prosecution was pursued as a
"1cover" or "sham," for the other sovereign, or that one sovereign acted as
a "tool" of the other.1 12 Defendants seldom prevail on a double jeopardy
3
claim based on the "tool" or "sham" logic."l
Although the Austin decision addressed excessive fines, the Austin
Court referred to United States v. Halper,114 a double jeopardy case, as
precedent for the principle that punishment "'cuts across the division
between the civil and the criminal law." 1 5 Because the Court spoke in
terms of punishment, defense attorneys are now raising the issue of
double jeopardy when a forfeiture is imposed at a proceeding separate

106. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,440 (1989) (construing U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.).
107. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82. 88 (1985).
108. Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 38.
109. See, e.g., id. (discussing the effect of cooperative agency investigation). Double jeopardy is
discussed in cases of cooperation between state and federal law enforcement agencies). United
States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 909 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Russotti, 717 F.2d 27, 31
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1273 (1984); United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071, 1074 (8th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182-83 (9th Cir. 1987).
110. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (1988) (allowing the Attorney General of the United States to
transfer forfeited property to a cooperating law enforcement agency).
111. Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 38.
112. Aboumoussallein. 726 F.2d at 910.
113. Id. For a discussion of almost prevailing on such a double jeopardy claim, see Bernhardt.
831 F.2d at 182-83. The district court had approved the Bemhardts' double jeopardy claim, but the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for further factual determinations.
114. 490 U.S. 436 (1989).
115. Austin. 113 S.Ct. at 2805 (quoting Halper,490 U.S. at 447-48).
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from the criminal trial. 116 There are some hints in Austin that the Court
may be leaning toward such a position,117 but case law before and after
Austin indicates otherwise. 118
For double jeopardy analysis of asset forfeitures, the question
becomes, not whether the forfeiture is punishment, but whether it is a
criminal punishment. If the punishment is criminal, then it becomes
subject to the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment. An
early case reaching this conclusion, and distinguishing between civil and
criminal punishments for double jeopardy purposes is Helvering v.
Mitchell.1 9 In Mitchell, the Court stated that the "double jeopardy clause
prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting to punish a second time
20
criminally, for the same offense." 1
The test used to determine whether a civil forfeiture constitutes
criminal punishment for Fifth Amendment purposes was set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms.12 1 Two steps are required under the test: first, whether the
legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, intended that the
sanction be criminal or civil in nature, and second, if the legislature
intended that the forfeiture be a civil penalty, whether the sanction
imposed is so punitive in nature as to negate the intent of the legislature. 12 2 To determine whether the legislature intended to impose a civil
penalty or criminal punishment, the court looks to the statute itself and
the manner in which it was enacted.1 23 Relevant factors in determining
the character of the forfeiture are whether the civil and criminal
sanctions are included in the same act and are "separate and distinct." 12 4
These factors, when applied to the North Dakota statutes, indicate a
legislative intent to enact both civil and criminal penalties for criminal
conduct.

116. See, e.g., Defendant's Brief at 3-4, State of North Dakota v. $1900 of United States
Currency, (Ward County Dist. Ct. 1993)(No. 90-1271).
117. See id., 113 S. Ct. at 2806 n.6 (stating that "inthis case we deal only with the question
whether the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies[,]" and declining to utilize tests
traditionally used for Fifth Amendment analysis); see also id. at 2805 n.4 (stating that the double
jeopardy clause has been held to not apply to forfeitures, but only where the forfeiture can be
characterized as remedial).
118. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 450-51 (stating that purpose of the multiple punishments provision of
the Fifth Amendment is to insure that the total punishment imposed by a court does not exceed that
authorized by the legislature).
119. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
120. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,399 (1938) (emphasis added).
121. 465 U.S. 354,362-63 (1984) (quoting United States v. Ward. 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
122. Id.
123. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236 (1972).
124. Id.
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Both the controlled substances forfeiture provisions125 and the
criminal penalties1 2 6 are included in the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act. Both provisions were enacted by the 1971 session of the North
Dakota Legislature.1 27 The criminal forfeiture statute1 28 specifically
2 9 It
provides that forfeiture is a "separate and distinct" proceeding.1
would be difficult to argue successfully that the legislature did not intend
to enact both civil and criminal penalties.
The second part of the double jeopardy analysis requires an
evaluation of whether the sanction imposed is so punitive in effect or
purpose as to negate the intention of the legislature.13 0 That proposition
is illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States,13 1 where, after the owner of the allegedly
smuggled jewels was acquitted of criminal charges, the government
initiated a civil forfeiture against the jewels. 132 The owner asserted a
defense of double jeopardy.1 33 In arriving at its decision that the
forfeiture action was not barred by double jeopardy, the Court said, "If
for no other reason, the forfeiture is not barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it involves neither two criminal
trials nor two criminal punishments." 134 The Court continued:
Forfeiture of goods or their value and the payment of fixed or
variable sums of money are other sanctions which have been
recognized as enforcible by civil proceedings. . . . In spite of
their comparative severity, such sanctions have been upheld
against the contention that they are essentially criminal and
subject to the procedural rules governing criminal prosecutions.135
In a later case, United States v. Halper, the Court qualified this
statement, holding that a civil sanction may take on criminal characteristics, and hence be subject to Fifth Amendment analysis, if the civil
sanction "may not be characterized as remedial, but only as deterrent or
retribution."1 3 6 Because civil asset forfeitures are brought in a separate

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36 (Supp. 1993).
Id. § 19-03.1-23.
1971 N.D. Laws ch. 235.
N.D. CENT. CODE §§. 29-31.1-01 to -10 (1991).
Id. § 29-31.1-04.
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354. 362-63 (1984).
409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972).
Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 232,33.
Id. at 235-36.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 237 (quoting Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 400).
United States v. Halper. 490 U.S. 435,449 (1989).
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action, and frequently at a different time, it is significant that the Court in
Halper limited its holding to instances in which the government seeks to
impose a fixed civil penalty at a separate proceeding, after punishment
37
has been imposed criminally.1
What constitutes a remedial sanction after the interpretation of
Halper by the present Court in Austin is not clear.13 8 An indication of
the shift in thinking after Austin may be found, however, in the Fourth
Circuit's rehearing of United States v. Borromeo.13 9 The appeal in
Borromeo was first decided in the Fourth Circuit while Austin was
pending in the United States Supreme Court.14 0 The court had decided
that neither instrumentalities nor proceeds of criminal conduct would be
subject to proportionality analysis under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 14 1
However, because of the pending decision in Austin, the Fourth Circuit
allowed an extension of time for Borromeo, and eventually reheard his
appeal.1 42 On rehearing after Austin, the court concluded that although
instrumentalities would be subject to proportionality analysis for double
jeopardy violations, proceeds might be exempt from such an analysis. 143
To explain its post-Austin rehearing decision, the Fourth Circuit said,
"[i]t is arguable that there is little justification for the position that one
who successfully parlays his tainted dollar into a fortune should be
permitted to enjoy a windfall-a result which a strict focus upon
proportionality might bring about in a given case with regard to the
proceeds of crime." 144 This distinction agrees with the logic applied by
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in United States v.
All Assets and Equipment of West Side Building Corp., 145 where the court
observed,
Austin does not require a proportionality analysis for property
acquired as proceeds of illegal drug transactions. If an item is
a proceed of an illegal drug transaction, its forfeiture is
exclusively remedial, as it cannot be considered punishment to
take away something the claimant never owned . . . . Austin

137. id. at 448-450.
138. Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2804-05 n.4.
139. 995 F.2d 23 (4th Cir. 1993).
140. United States v. Borromeo. I F.3d 219, 220 (4th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Borromeo 111.
141. Borroneo, 995 F.2d at 27.
142. Borroneo //,1F.3d at 220.
143. Id. at 221.
144. Id.
145. 843 F. Supp. 377 (N.D. I11.
1993).
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does apply to property used to facilitate illegal drug activi-

ties.146
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that Austin did not
apply to a case involving the forfeiture of $650,000 in personal property
because the property was proceeds from a large drug-trafficking
operation.1 4 7 The court concluded double jeopardy would not prohibit
making drug traffickers "cough up" all their proceeds.1 4 8 The court
reasoned that a person who possesses proceeds from illegal activity
cannot have a reasonable expectation that the law will allow that person
to keep the property. 149 The court also analogized that forfeiting
monetary proceeds of illegal activity is like confiscating stolen money
from a robber, which is not considered "punishment."150
Although the double jeopardy proportionality test is the same test as
that applied for Eighth Amendment purposes, the theoretical basis for
the test is different and the test results are used differently. When
proportionality is applied under the Eighth Amendment, the test
determines whether the punishment imposed is excessive, cruel, or
unusual. When proportionality is evaluated for double jeopardy
purposes, a violation of proportionality results in a determination that
criminal punishment has occurred. If criminal punishment was imposed
by a procedure separate from the criminal prosecution, a violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause may be found.151 Because of the Supreme
Court's holding in Halper, the remedial nature of a civil penalty is the
focal point of the double jeopardy proportionality test. 152
To determine what may be considered remedial in a forfeiture,
courts look to the cost of the criminal activity to the government,1 53 and
possibly to the cost to others.154 Specifically includible as remedial
assessments are the costs of investigation, enforcement, and direct
damages to the government.1 55 This computation of costs must be an
individualized accounting of the direct costs of the defendant's conduct,

146. United States v. West Side Bldg. Corp., 843 F. Supp. 377, 383 (N.D. I11.
1993).
147. United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1994).
148. Id. at 298-99.
149. Id. at 300.
150. Id. at 297.
151. For a discussion of what constitutes a single proceeding, see United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d
17, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1993).
152. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989).
153. Id.; Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1992).
154. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987) (including in the cost of the
defendant's conduct such items as the loss caused; physical harm to others which is inflicted, risked, or
threatened; and collateral consequences of the defendant's conduct).
155. Whalers Cove. 954 F.2d at 36.
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proportional to the defendant's offense, but may include a "reasonable
allocation of more generalized enforcement costs." 156 In making this
accounting, "the government is entitled to rough remedial justice[;]" the
"sanction [may not be] overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages
[the defendant] has caused."157
In summary, the trend appears to be toward a qualified acceptance
of the Scalia test for proportionality in both excessive fines analysis and
double jeopardy analysis: if the property is used to facilitate a crime,
then its relationship to the crime is a factor to be used in a proportionality analysis. If the relationship between property and crime is not direct
and intimate, then the value of the forfeited property is compared to the
magnitude of the crime, first deducting the portion of the property value
that may be attributed to government costs and damages. Once the
remedial costs are deducted, an asset forfeiture violates double jeopardy
under the current interpretation if (1) the forfeiture is imposed by the
same sovereign which conducted the criminal prosecution, (2) at a
procedure separate from the criminal prosecution, and (3) the value of
the property is grossly in excess of an amount which could be characterized as remedial.

C.

THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS' PROTECTION
AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS

In addition to Eighth Amendment and double jeopardy issues, an
asset forfeiture raises substantive and procedural due process concerns.
Among these concerns are the forfeiture of property to the government
in a proceeding at which the claimant of the property has the burden of
proof.15 8 Innocent owner provisions, which require consent, knowledge,
or willful blindness on the part of owners of property, have been added
to most forfeiture statutes. 159 Under these statutes, however, the claimant
must prove a defense rather than the government proving the owner's
involvement with criminal activity. 16 0 In addition, the initial seizure of

156. Id. at 37.
157. Halper, 490 U.S. at 446-49.
158. United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 57 (2d Cir. 1993) (questioning the fairness of
requiring the claimant to prove the "innocence" of the property, and stating, "'[wie continue to be
enormously troubled by the government's increasing and virtually unchecked use of civil forfeiture
statutes and the disregard for due process that is buried in these statutes'" (quoting United States v. All
Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir. 1992))).
159. See, N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36(e)(2) (1991) (protecting the innocent owner of a
conveyance); § 29-31.1-07 (protecting innocent owners, but requiring a reasonable inquiry); 21 U.S.C.
§§ 881(a)(4)(C) (a)(7) (requiring knowledge or consent of the owner, or "willful blindness" in the
case of a conveyance).
160. United States v. 890 Noyac Road, 945 F.2d 1252, 1255 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States
v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870.878 (2d Cir. 1990).
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property frequently takes place without a hearing.161 Although most
forfeiture statutes contain a requirement for promptly initiating a
forfeiture action and allowing the claimant a hearing,16 2 courts have
widely varying interpretations of what "promptly" means, as well as the
result of the government's failure to act promptly.163
1. Real Property vs. PersonalProperty
In United States v. Good Real Property,164 its most recent forfeiture
decision, the Supreme Court distinguished between the due process
protections afforded the owners of real property and those afforded the
owners of personal property.16 5 Because, unlike personal property, real
property can neither be removed from the jurisdiction of the court nor
be easily destroyed, the Court held that a pre-hearing seizure of real
property violates a claimant's due process rights, except in very rare
circumstances. 16 6 Limiting its decision to real property, the Court in
Good Real Property applied the three-part inquiry from Mathews v.
Eldridge167 to balance the due process rights of the claimant against the
needs of the government in a forfeiture.16 8 The Court held that absent
exigent circumstances, the due process clause requires notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard before real property may be seized
by the government.16 9

161. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663. 677 (1973) (agreeing that
seizure for purposes of forfeiture is one of those "'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing
notice and opportunity for a hearing" (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972))).
162. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-36(3) (1991) (requiring that proceedings be initiated
promptly when property is seized without process); see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1604 (1988) (requiring
the Attorney General to immediately and forthwith bring a forfeiture action if one is warranted).
163. Compare Haina v. Commonwealth. 369 S.E.2d 401 (Va. 1988) (holding that failure by the
state to bring an action within the 60 days required by statute resulted in a loss of jurisdiction over the
forfeiture) with Lamar v. Universal Supply Co., Inc., 479 So. 2d 109, 110 (Fla. 1985) (holding that
failure by the state to institute action promptly triggers an analysis similar to that in Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). Some courts have held that failure to initiate forfeiture within a specified
time after seizure may result in a loss of jurisdiction. Haina v. Commonwealth, 369 S.E.2d 401 (Va.
1988). It is important to note. however, that the statute being interpreted when loss of jurisdictiuon was
found specified that the action must be initiated within 60 days, rather than "promptly." Id. The North
Dakota forfeiture statute requires prompt initiation after ex parte seizure. N.D. CENT. CODE §
19-03.1-36(3) (1991).
164. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
165. United States v. Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 502-03 (1993).
166. Id.
167. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); The Mathews v. Eldridge test involves a balancing of the private
interest affected by the action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the
procedures used, the probable value of additional safeguards. the government's interest, and the
administrative burden that additional safeguards would impose on the government. Id. at 332-35.
168. Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 501.
169. Id.
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The significance of the Court's decision in Good Real Property is
evident when viewed from the perspective of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co. ,170 a case the Court had decided two decades earlier.
In Calero-Toledo, the Court found in favor of the government in its
pre-hearing seizure of a yacht, holding that the ex parte seizure did not
violate due process. 17 1 In distinguishing Calero-Toledo from Good Real
Property, however, the Court said, "[c]entral to our analysis in
Calero-Toledo, was the fact that a yacht was the 'sort [of property] that
could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if
advance warning of confiscation were given."1 72
Since the Court did not overrule Calero-Toledo and took great care
to distinguish Good Real Property,17 3 Calero-Toledo still provides the
constitutional justification for pre-notice and hearing seizure of personal
property.1 74 The three-part test articulated in Calero-Toledo applies to
personal property and asks three questions: (1) does the seizure serve
significant governmental interests, (2) would a pre-seizure notice and
hearing frustrate the interests served by the statutes, and (3) is the seizure
initiated by self-interested parties.1 7 5 A claimant might find support
today asserting that the government's interest in certain types of personal
property would not be diminished if pre-seizure notice and hearing were
given, or by asserting that self-interest is served by some seizures, since
proceeds from forfeitures contribute substantial portions to some law
enforcement budgets. Central to the government's case, on the other
hand, is the powerful argument that personal property associated with
criminal activity, particularly drug trafficking, will likely be removed,
destroyed, or concealed if advance warning is given.
2.

Promptness in Bringing the Forfeiture Action vs.
Promptness in Providing a Hearing After Seizure
There is a significant difference between the government failing to
initiate a forfeiture promptly after the commission of the underlying
crime and failing to initiate action promptly after seizing the property.17 6

170. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
171. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679-80 (1974).
172. Good Real Property, 114 S.Ct. at 500 (quoting Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 679).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 679; see also State v. One Black 1989 Cadillac, No. 930352, slip
op. (N.D. Oct. 3, 1994) (analyzing the due process considerations and citing Good Real Property and
Calero-Toledo. but declining to determine whether exigent circumstances were present in the seizure
of a vehicle because the claimant did not raise the issue).
176. See Good Real Property, 114 S.Ct. at 507 (explaining that all that is necessary to comply
with the promptly requirement for initiation of an action is to comply with the statue of limitations).
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If the government does not seize the property and complies with the
statute of limitations in initiating a forfeiture, but fails to comply with
other statutory requirements for action, such as "prompt" or "immediate"
reporting, "federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their
own coercive sanction." 17 7
The Supreme Court's position here is
grounded in the belief that if Congress wished dimissal of the forfeiture
action for failure to comply with requirements other than the statute of
limitations, Congress would have indicated that intent. 178 The remedy
for failure to comply with what- is labeled "internal timing requirements"
is thus left to those administering the forfeiture statute.179
Prompt initiation of an action after seizure of property without a
warrant or pre-seizure notice and hearing is, however, an entirely
different matter. The requirement of prompt initiation after seizure is
included in forfeiture statutes to assure compliance with due process. 180
When the government uses the warrantless seizure provisions of
forfeiture law to prevent the escape of the property from the jurisdiction
of the court, it must initiate forfeiture proceedings promptly,181 because
failure to do so denies the owner the use of the property for an extended
period without due process.18 2 The current trend by the courts is to
interpret the "promptly" requirement strictly. If the government seizes
property without process, and a forfeiture proceeding is not initiated
within several weeks, the delay may be fatal to the forfeiture unless a
reasonable justification is offered.
Most courts agree that the proper test to evaluate promptness in this
18 4
context is the Barker v. Wingo 183 test, adapted from criminal law.
Although the Barker Court was addressing the Sixth Amendment right to
a speedy trial rather than the Fifth Amendment right against deprivation
of property without due process, the balancing test from Barker
nonetheless provides an appropriate means to analyze the delay between
seizure and hearing in asset forfeitures.1 8 5 Factors included in the
Barker test are the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the

177. Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 506.
178. Id.
179. Id. But see Haina, 369 S.E.2d at 401.
180. In Re Forfeiture of $7,750.00, 546 So. 2d 1128. 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. One
Black 1989 Cadillac, No. 930352 (N.D. Oct. 3, 1994).
181. United States v. $8850. 461 U.S. 555, 563 (1982).
182. ld.
183. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
184. $8850. 461 U.S. at 564. See also United States v. $18,500.10, 739 F.2d 354, 356 (8th Cir.
1984) (applying Barker test); United States v. One 1987 Ford F-350 4x4 Pickup, 739 F. Supp. 554,
560-61 (D. Kan. 1990); State v. One 1984 Chevrolet Corvette, 818 P. 2d 800, 804 (Kan. App. 1991)
(applying Barker test to state forfeiture of a vehicle); 1989 Cadillac,No. 930352 Slip op. at 7-8..
185. $8,850.461 U.S. at 564. See also $18,505.10, 739 F.2d at 356.
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defendant's assertion of his or her rights, and any prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the seizure and delay in the hearing.1 86 The
Barker analysis essentially views "the circumstances as a whole" in each
case.1 87

In United States v. $8,850,188 the Supreme Court also held that the
balancing of these factors in determining reasonableness of delay is a
fact-based determination and will depend "heavily on the context of the
particular situation ....,,
189 Using the Barker analysis and the $8850
fact-based determination, courts have found delays varying from
fifty-nine days' 90 to eighteen months1 9 1 to be reasonable and not a
92
violation of due process.1
For example, a delay of five months and one week was not
improper where the state used the property to be forfeited as evidence in
a criminal proceeding, the claimant never requested a judicial hearing,
and there was no evidence that the claimant was prejudiced. 193 In United
States v. One 1978 Cadillac Sedan DeVille, 194 the court surveyed
numerous decisions to determine whether the four and one-half month
delay in that case was unreasonable.1 9 5 The court observed that delays
found to be unreasonable greatly exceeded the four and one half
months at issue in 1978 Cadillac.196 The court noted that delays for up

186. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
187. State v. $435,000, 842 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1992).
188. 461 U.S. 555 (1983).
189. Id. at565 n.14.
190. Corvette, 818 P.2d at 804.
191. $8,850,461 U.S. at 569,
192. See also United States v. Turner, 933 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1991) (16-month delay did not
violate due process where government believed the asset was forfeited under state law and initiated
proceedings immediately upon learning of error); United States v. Land at 2 Burditt Street, 924 F.2d
383 (1st Cir. 1991) (ten-month delay not improper); United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866
F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1989) (four and one-half month delay on warrantless seizure acceptable when
owner did not seek return and the vehicle was subject to IRS lien); United States v. $160,916.25, 750
F.2d 900 (11 th Cir. 1985) (14-month delay did not violate due process where delay was "attributable to
Government's massive criminal investigation and prosecution of very criminal activity that generated
funds"); United States v. $18,505.10, 739 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1984) (26-month delay acceptable where
property used as evidence, claimants did not assert rights and did not show prejudice); United States v.
F-350 4x4 Pickup, 739 F. Supp. at 554 (D. Kan. 1990) (holding four and one-half month delay not
unreasonable); see generally Ana Kdllia Ramares, Annotation. Timeliness of Institution of Proceedings
for Forfeiture Under Uniform ControlledSubstancesAct or Similar Statute. 90 A.L.R. 493 (1991).
193. State v. One 1986 Subaru, 576 A.2d 859 (N.J. 1990).
194. 490 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
195. United States v. One 1978 Cadillac Sedan DeVille. 490 F. Supp. 725. 732-33 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
196. The court in 1978 Cadillac relied upon:
United States v. One 1970 Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1977) (eleven-month delay
unreasonable); United States v. One Motor Yacht Named Mercury, 527 F.2d 1112 (1st
Cir. 1975) (twelve-and-one-half-month delay unreasonable); Sarkisian v. United States.
472 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1973) (fourteen-month delay unreasonable); United States v.
Eight (8) Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (sixteen-month
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to six months were not unreasonable. 197 Delays that federal courts have
found objectionable generally exceed six months or longer, depending
98
upon the reasons for the delay.1
Taking a slightly different approach, the Eleventh Circuit in a recent
case held that the application of Barker is a mixed question of fact and
law.1 9 9 The court relied upon the rationale in $8,850, and noted that
pending criminal proceedings present a "weighty" justification for delay
20 0
because the civil proceeding could hamper the criminal proceeding.
The court also noted that diligent pursuit of criminal proceedings
indicates that the reasons for delay were substantial. 2 0 1 Finally, the
question of prejudice to the claimant should focus on whether the delay
has hampered presenting a defense on the merits, such as losing a witness
or other important evidence. 202
The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the Barker analysis in
State v. One Black 1989 Cadillac.203 In 1989 Cadillac the owner of the
vehicle submitted a motion to dismiss'claiming that the 174-day lapse
between seizure and service of the forfeiture complaint was an undue
delay that divested the court of jurisdiction. 20 4 The state resisted the
motion to dismiss. 20 5 The state argued that delay did not result in loss of
jurisdiction; rather, an allegation of undue delay required application of
the Barker analysis. 20 6 To that end, the state submitted evidence that a
narcotics agent had participated in negotiations with the owner of the
vehicle which involved the owner's purchase of controlled substances as
part of a continuing criminal investigation. 207 The state argued that the
confidential nature of the ongoing criminal investigation was the reason
for the delay. 2 0 8 The owner agreed that he participated in negotiations
delay unreasonable); United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 436 F. Supp.
1292 (S.D. Ga. 1977) (eleven-month delay unreasonable); United States v. A Quantity
of Gold Jewelry, 379 F. Supp. 283 (C.D.Cal. 1974) (twenty-two-month delay
unreasonable); United States v. One 1971 Opel G.T.,'360 F. Supp. 638 (C.D.Cal. 1973)
(twelve-and-one-half-month delay unreasonable). But see United States v. One 1972
Wood Custom Boat, 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974) (ten-month delay not unreasonable
because investigation continuing).
490 F. Supp. at 732-33.
197. Id.
198. In re 1975 Chevrolet Corvette, Two-Door Auto.. 424 So. 2d 152, 153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) ("The cases in which federal courts have found an unreasonable delay have generally involved
greater delays than the six-month total period here" (citations omitted)).
199. United States v. Premises Located at Route 13, 946 F.2d 749,755 (1 th Cir. 1991).
200. Id. (citing $8,850, 461 U.S. 555,567).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. No. 930352. slip op. (N.D. Oct. 3. 1994).
204. State v. One Black 1989 Cadillac, No. 930352, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Oct. 3 1994).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 7.
207. ld. at 12-13.
208. Id. at 13.
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for the criminal investigation, but also asserted that the narcotics agent
09
had made it clear that the forfeiture was not negotiable. 2
In applying Barker, the court considered the first factor, the length
of the delay, to be the "overarching factor." 2 10 The court found the
174-day delay a "significant" lapse of time. 2 11 The reason for the delay,
the second factor, is a question of fact. 2 12 Although the court purported
to construe the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, it
2 13
concluded that there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact.
The court wrote: "The State's affidavits do not explain why the delay was
a necessary component of the negotiations, or if the negotiations were
the reason for the delay in instituting the proceedings." 2 14
This conclusion ignores the fact that the affidavits were submitted in
response to a motion 2 15 in which the only issues were delay and whether
the reasons submitted by the state, via its affidavits, justified the delay. It
also ignores the principle that when construing evidence in a light most
favorable to a non-moving party in a summary judgment motion, the
court will draw reasonable inferences from the facts. 2 16 In this instance,
it is reasonable to infer that a private citizen's negotiations with a
narcotics agent concerning the purchase of controlled substances as part
of a criminal investigation must be kept confidential and that the public
filing of a forfeiture case or criminal charges involving that individual
would likely compromise the investigation. The court concluded that
these inferences were assertions of fact which were not part of the
affidavit and therefore could not be considered as justification for the
delay. The court's unwillingness to draw any reasonable inferences from
uncontroverted facts illustrates the tendency of the judiciary to strictly
construe forfeiture statutes against the government.
Although the court applied the third prong of the Barker test,
whether the claimant asserted his right to property, 2 17 the court modified
the test. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that because the
statute did not require the claimant to assert any rights, any failure to do

209. 1989 Cadillac, No. 930352. slip op. at 13 (N.D. Oct. 3, 1994).
210. Id. at 12 (quoting $8,850, 461 U.S. at 565).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 13.
214. 1989 Cadillac, No. 930352, slip op. at 13. But see United States v. $160,916.25, 750 F.2d
900 (11 th Cir. 1985) (14-month delay did not violate due process where delay was attributable to
massive criminal investigation).
215. The owner of the vehicle submitted a motion to dismiss with a supporting affidavit. The
state responded with affidavits. As such, the motion is properly treated as one for summary judgment.
216. Livingood v. Meece, 477 N.W.2d 183. 187 (N.D. 1991).
217. See $8,850. 461 U.S. at 564.

876

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70:4

so would not be held against the claimant; rather, the state would be held
to its affirmative duty to proceed promptly. 2 18 The court reasoned that
the property owner's action is relevant only if he acts to vindicate his
2 19
right to the property or if he consents to the delay.
The final prong of the Barker test, prejudice to the claimant, was
similarly strictly construed against the state. The owner of the 1989
Cadillac admitted that the delay did not prejudice his ability to present a
defense. 2 20 Notwithstanding this admission, the court supplied its own
reasons for prejudice. 2 2 1 The court found that the owner was prejudiced
because he was deprived of the use and enjoyment and the right of sale
of the automobile. 2 22 Further prejudice was found because a vehicle is a
wasting asset. 2 23 Finally, the court concluded that the owner's due
process rights were prejudiced by the fact that the seizure was accomplished without "any prior process." 22 4 The court suggested that
"pre-seizure, ex parte process in the form a warrant issued by a detached
magistrate" would help "ensure the probable validity of the State's
claim." 2 25 Although the statute does not require this procedure, in order
to facilitate successful forfeiture actions, law enforcement should
consider obtaining an ex parte warrant whenever circumstances
permit. 22 6 The court supplied factors of prejudice which illustrate the
tendency to strictly construe forfeiture statutes. 2 2 7 The court thus
concluded that, as a matter of law, the forfeiture was not prompt. 2 28
When interpreting a statute similar to North Dakota's, the majority
of courts have held that the failure to initiate action promptly does not
divest the court of jurisdiction, but merely triggers an evaluation by the
court under the Barker balancing test described above. 22 9 Some states
with specific time restrictions, such as that evaluated in Haina v.
Commonwealth, have also held that a failure to comply with a statutory
deadline does not divest the court of jurisdiction. 230
When the time limit is interpreted as directory in nature, it provides
the defendant with a means to force action by the state by bringing a

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226
227,
228.
229.
230.

1989 Cadillac.No. 930352, slip op. at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
1989 Cadillac, No. 930352, slip op. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
1989 Cadillac,No. 930352, slip op. at 16.
See e.g., Lamar v. Universal Supply Co.. Inc., 479 So. 2d 109, 110-111 (Fla. 1985).
Matter of Sopoci. 467 N.W.2d 799. 800 (Iowa 1991).
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motion before the court. 23 1 This interpretation fits well with the Barker
test: if the defendant wishes to assert his or her right to an early hearing,
the state must provide one; if no assertion of that right is made, the
defendant's acquiescence may be weighed in favor of the state in a
Barker analysis.
A successful due process challenge to an asset forfeiture must then
be made under one of two theories: 1) the property was seized ex parte
without any threat to jurisdiction or the property, or 2) the defendant was
not granted a hearing "promptly" after ex parte seizure.
IV. CONCLUSION
The usual asset forfeiture in North Dakota involves either cash or a
vehicle seized in connection with a controlled substance arrest. As a rule,
challenging these forfeitures on proportionality grounds will not be
fruitful. Cash seized will most frequently be a combination of proceeds
and money intended to be used for drug purchases, making it subject to
partial exemption from proportionality analysis. The basic costs of an
investigation and arrest are ordinarily far in excess of the value of the
property seized, making the forfeiture entirely remedial. The most
questionable seizures are those of real estate and the more valuable
vehicles which cannot be tied to extensive use in drug transactions.
These would not ordinarily qualify as instrumentalities under the Scalia
logic, their value could be in excess of the amount considered remedial,
and hence their forfeiture would be considered disproportionate to the
crime and violative of the Excessive Fines Clause. If the vehicle or real
estate is forfeited at a proceeding separate from the criminal action,
double jeopardy may also be invoked.
An additional concern is the length of time which elapses between a
warrantless seizure and the forfeiture hearing. The lapse of time here is
the time during which the claimant has been deprived of property
without a hearing. If the state has not filed its complaint, and there is no
good reason for the delay, such as an ongoing criminal prosecution or
investigation, a period beyond several weeks could be excessive.
Although successful challenges to asset forfeitures after Austin will
continue to be limited, the forfeitures which pose a clear opportunity to
prevail will be those which meet the obvious constitutional violations
outlined above: those grossly disproportionate to the crime committed,
and seizures without process and without opportunity to reclaim the
property for extended periods.

231. Lanar, 479 So. 2d at 110.

